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Bill Frelick*
Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return:
First Asylum and First Principles of
Refugee Protection* *
The U.S. policy of interdicting and summarily returning Haitian asylum
seekers without a hearing legitimately raises the specter of refoulement-
the forced return of genuine refugees. Given the clear prohibition of
refoulement in international law, it might seem odd, at first, to devote an
article to the impact of this policy on the question of preserving first
asylum, a concept upon which less international legal consensus rests.
Nevertheless, this Article will focus on the damage done to the concept
of first asylum by the U.S. government's policy on Haitian asylum seek-
ers. It will further argue that this damage seriously undermines funda-
mental refugee rights principles. More particularly, this Article will
examine the notion of first asylum, and the special obligations for States
with mass refugee flow.
While common sense would seem to link the idea of asylum to the
principle of non-refoulement-after all, a refugee who is not returned to
the country where he faces persecution must be permitted to reside
somewhere-international and domestic law have kept the two concepts
distinct. Non-refoulement is mandated by Article 33 of the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Con-
vention), which provides that "[n]o Contracting State shall expel or
return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers
of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social
group or political opinion."' Refoulement is similarly prohibited in sec-
tion 243(h) of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): "The
Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a country
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1. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S.
137, art. 33.1 [hereinafter "Convention"].
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... [where] such alien's life or freedom would be threatened .... ,,2
Asylum, however, is mandated neither by the Refugee Convention,
nor by U.S. law. Section 208 of the INA clearly makes the granting of
asylum discretionary. It provides that ". . . the alien may be granted
asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General
determines that such alien is a refugee.. .. ,,3 Likewise, the operative
clauses of the Refugee Convention are silent with regard to asylum.
However, the Preamble mentions the word "asylum," and, in particular,
addresses the importance of preserving first asylum. The Preamble also
addresses the issue of burden-sharing as an essential means of maintain-
ing first asylum: "Considering that the grant of asylum may place unduly
heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a
problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international
scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international co-
operation." 4 Despite this promising start, however, the States drafting
the Refugee Convention seemed intent on reserving what they viewed as
a sovereign right to decide who should be granted asylum.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights5 has more generous
language on asylum, but it is nonbinding. Article 14(1) states that
"[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution."'6 While the language is helpful, the meaning of "to
enjoy" is somewhat vague. Governments grant asylum; individuals
"enjoy" it. An individual's right to enjoy asylum is therefore limited by
the willingness of the government to proffer it.
The original draft of Article 14(1) provided that "[e]veryone has the
right to seek and begranted in other countries asylum from persecution."' 7
That draft, however, was opposed by the delegates from the United
Kingdom, Australia, and Saudi Arabia, on the grounds that it would
limit state sovereignty.8
In 1967, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously
adopted the Declaration on Territorial Asylum,9 which reiterated the
principle of non-refoulement and clarified that it included non-rejection at
the frontier.' 0 The Declaration also called on all states to share the bur-
2. Immigration and Nationality Act § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988).
3. Id. § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988).
4. Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasis in original).
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III),
U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
6. Id. art. 14(1).
7. U.N. Doc. A/C 3/285 Rev. 1 (1948) (emphasis added).
8. RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 219 (1972).
9. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312,22 U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess.,
Supp. No. 16 at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6912 (1967) [hereinafter Declaration on Territorial
Asylum]. The text can also be found in ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, TERRITORIAL ASYLUM
162, app. EE (1980).
10. Id. art. 3(1): "No person referred to in Article 1, paragraph 1, shall be sub-jected to measures such as rejection at the frontier or, if he has already entered the
territory in which he seeks asylum, expulsion or compulsory return to any State
where he may be subjected to persecution."
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den imposed on first asylum countries. It stated, "[w]here a State finds
difficulty in granting or continuing to grant asylum, States individually
or jointly or through the United Nations shall consider, in a spirit of
international solidarity, appropriate measures to lighten the burden on
that State."I"
States were not willing, however, to impose on themselves the
requirement to grant asylum to a refugee. A United Nations conference
that was convened to draft a Convention on Territorial Asylum in 1977
ended in failure. 12 Although unsuccessful in coming up with a Conven-
tion, the Committee of the Whole at the United Nations Conference on
Territorial Asylum did declare that States "shall endeavor" to grant asy-
lum to eligible persons, a declaration that the leading authority on the
Conference, Grahl-Madsen, termed an "unsatisfactory formulation."'13
The Executive Committee ("ExCom") of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") provides important guidance
on the standards of State practice. It adopts formal Conclusions that
help to establish customary international understanding concerning the
norms for the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. On the ques-
tion of protection of asylum seekers in situations of large-scale influx,
the ExCom formally concluded that:
asylum seekers should be admitted to the State in which they first seek
refuge and if that State is unable to admit them on a durable basis, it
should always admit them at least on a temporary basis and provide them
with protection .... In all cases the fundamental principle of non-refoule-
ment-including non-rejection at the frontier-must be scrupulously
observed. 14
The focus of the two major court challenges to the Haitian refugee
policy, Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker 15 and Sale v. Haitian Centers Coun-
cil 6 has not been on the right of entry or the concept of asylum at all,
but on the principle of non-refoulement, particularly whether it is applica-
ble extraterritorially. For example, the amicus curiae brief submitted by
the UNHCR in Haitian Refugee Center stated,
Although international guidelines and State practice support at least the
temporary admission of 'boat people' and asylum seekers in situations of
mass influx, this case is not about admission or asylum .... It is about the
obligation of States not to return refugees to a place where their lives or
11. Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 9, at 81.
12. Guy GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 111 (1983). Good-
win-Gill called the Conference "an abject failure." Id. at vii. Atle Grahl-Madsen
called the Conference "highly politicized, indeed catastrophic." Id.
13. GRAHL-MADSEN, supra note 9, at 50.
14. Protection of Asylum Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx, Conclusion No. 22
(XXXII) 1981, UNHCR CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFU-
GEES 49 (1991) [hereinafter CONCLUSIONS].
15. 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd, 949 F.2d 1109 (I1th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
16. Sale v. Hatian Centers Council, 807 F. Supp. 928 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), cert.
granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
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freedom would be threatened by persecution.17
The legal issue is narrowly drawn. Limiting the question to the
legality of forced summary return from the high seas has a political ben-
efit as well; it begs the question of where refugees who ought not to be
returned ought to be permitted to stay. As it stands, a favorable out-
come to the plaintiffs could still leave open the question of where to put
and how to treat the refugees, even if the principle of nonrefoulement were
to be respected.
Critics of U.S. policy, including this author, have suggested alterna-
tive models of temporary safe haven in the region, including the use of
the U.S. naval base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. This would preserve the
principle of non-refoulement, while at the same time averting a mass influx
of Haitians into the United States.' 8 For refugee rights advocates, the
draconian measures taken by the United States have changed the param-
eters of what is considered acceptable. We have become minimalist in
our demands, not because we are any less committed to advocating for a
range of rights and benefits for refugees and asylum seekers, but
because the violations committed by our government deny even mini-
mum standards of refugee protection that we had thought were no
longer open to question.
I. Political Context: Fear of Mass Haitian Influx to the United States
The development of the United States repatriation policy on the polit-
ical front is noteworthy. The Bush Administration's policies towards the
Haitian refugees evolved by fits and starts, and was influenced by elec-
tion-year politics, court challenges, and a growing number of asylum
seekers. On November 20, after the U.S. Coast Guard forcibly repatri-
ated the first boatload of "screened out" Haitians since the September
30 coup in Haiti, President George Bush declared, "[i]t is a fair pol-
icy."'19 The policy, he said, "does make a distinction between economic
refugees and political refugees."'20
Barred off and on from returning the Haitians by several court
injunctions, the Bush Administration was engaged in a debate in the
courts and in Congress from late November through late May over
whether, in fact, the screening was fair. But throughout that period the
parameters of the debate were set by Bush's own statement that his
17. Brief for Amicus Curiae, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, in Support of Apellees at 3-4, Haitian Refugee Center, 789 F. Supp. 1552
(S.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245
(1992). Emphasis added on first italics; italics in the original on the word "return."
18. See Bill Frelick, Clinton and Haiti: No More Bush Policy, PHILA. INQUIRER,Jan. 19,
1993, at Al1; Bill Frelick, Haitian Exodus: The Refugees Deserue Temporary Protection, Not
Forced Repatriation, WASH. POST, May 24, 1992, at C7; Bill Frelick, The Haitian Boat
People, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 20, 1991, at 18.
19. Al Kamen, Bush Defends Policy on Return of Haitians, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1991,
at A36.
20. Id.
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Administration's policy made a distinction between economic and polit-
ical refugees. The debate revolved around the adequacy of the policy's
screening procedure-whether people were being screened out as eco-
nomic migrants who, in fact, might have been refugees-not the denial
of screening for refugee status altogether.
Bush was reiterating the parameters of the debate set earlier by
President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order No. 12,324, which created
the Haitian interdiction operation. 2' That order authorized the U.S.
Coast Guard to stop and board vessels "of foreign nations with whom
we have arrangements," and to "return the vessel and its passengers to
the country from which it came, when there is reason to believe that an
offense is being committed against the United States immigration laws
. . .provided that no person who is a refugee will be returned without his
consent."
22
In the first legal challenge, Haitian Refugee Center,23 the plaintiffs
charged that due to the flaws in the screening procedures, refugees were
being returned to Haiti in violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
District Judge C. Clyde Atkins evaluated the adequacy of the screening
procedures and issued a preliminary injunction preventing the govern-
ment from repatriating interdicted Haitians until it could show how it
would "implement and follow procedures ... to ensure that Haitians
with bona fide political asylum claims are not forced to return to Haiti
"24
However, the parameters of the debate quickly shifted. What had
been the central issue-the adequacy and legitimacy of pre-asylum
screening-became a peripheral, if not irrelevant issue. The Bush
Administration argued that "Article 33(1) [of the Convention] is simply
inapplicable in this case," and staked out a position that Article 33(1)
did not prohibit forcible repatriation even of those Haitians determined
to be refugees with legitimate fears for their lives and freedom.2 5 First,
the government argued that the Protocol was not "self-executing."
Consequently, unless and until Congress implements the Protocol's pro-
visions in domestic law, the Protocol itself cannot be interpreted as a
source of rights.2 6 Second, the government argued that Article 33(1)
only applies to refugees "within the territory of a contracting State." 2 7
21. Exec. Order.No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48, 109, (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (Supp. V. 1981).
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1991), rev'd, 949 F.2d 1109 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
24. Order Granting Preliminary Injunctive Relief and Supporting Memorandum
Opinion, at 62, id.
25. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition to the Petition for a Writ of Certio-
rari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in the Supreme Court of
the United States at 10-11, id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Because the Haitians were interdicted in international waters, it could
not be said they were returned from the United States.
It appeared at the time that U.S. policy was being driven by the fear
of an influx of refugees into Florida, a critical State in President Bush's
reelection bid. Florida looked susceptible to inroads from challengers
Pat Buchanan and former Ku Klux Klansman David Duke, who both
took strong anti-immigrant stances in the Republican primaries. Even in
Bush's first public statement on the policy on November 21, when he
claimed to respect the distinction between political refugees and eco-
nomic migrants, Bush tipped his hand saying, "I don't want to have a
policy that acts as a magnet to risk these people's lives."2 8 He could
have added: or that acts as a magnet that would bring them to the
United States.
During the campaign, Buchanan declared:
There are flood tides of new immigrants coming into the country and I
think these... contribute to some of the social problems we've got in
America .... [I]f present trends hold, white Americans will be a minority
by 2050 .... What happened to make America so vulgar and coarse, so
uncivil and angry? Is it a coincidence that racial and ethnic conflicts per-
vade our media when the racial and ethnic character of the U.S. has
changed more in four decades than in the previous twenty?29
The anti-immigrant "America First" stand was also used effectively
by a Democrat, Senator Harris Wofford, to win a special election on
November 5, defeating a prominent member of the Bush cabinet, Attor-
ney General Dick Thornburgh, in the race to fill the Senate seat of the
deceased Senator John Heinz. Wofford's victory was widely touted as a
referendum on the Bush Administration's neglect of the "domestic
agenda."8 0 The "America First" movement took on a particularly xeno-
phobic cast, with a rise in Japan-bashing, the failure of Congress to enact
a foreign aid bill in October, and the Governor of California, Pete Wil-
son, blaming immigrants for a "taxpayer squeeze."3 1
An organized anti-immigrant lobby was quick to sound the alarm
about the potential of a Haitian mass influx, particularly attempting to
play on fears in Florida. The executive director of the largest anti-immi-
grant advocacy group, the Federation for American Immigration
Reform ("FAIR"), declared:
We've got another Mariel Boatlift in the making in Haiti. It's almost like
deja vu. The similarities between Cuba 1980 and Haiti 1991 are eerie.
28. Kamen, supra note 19, at A36.
29. Pat Buchanan, quoted by BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23, 1992, and cited by Frank
Sharry, executive director, National Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Forum,
Backgrounder for Advocates: Why We Want Your Help in Fighting Nativism, Apr. 1, 1992, at
1-2.
30. NEWSDAY, Mar. 22, 1992, at 31; Al Kamen, For Haitians, a U.S. Way Station in
Cuba, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at Al; Renee Loth, Red, White and Scared, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 24, 1991, at A21.
31. John Dillon, Migration to U.S. Expected to Break Record in "90s, CHRISTIAN ScI.
MONITOR, Nov. 21, 1991, at 8.
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Along with a handful of legitimate political refugees, is an army of eco-
nomic migrants waiting to descend on South Florida. We made a mistake
in Cuba and we ought not to compound that error by repeating it with
Haiti.3 2
The legal battle was not immune from these political pressures.
"The nature of this case from beginning to end was extraordinarily
political," said Ira Kurzban, lead attorney for the Haitian Refugee
Center.33 Kurzban noted that for only the third time in U.S. history the
Solicitor General of the United States argued on behalf of the executive
branch before a U.S. district court. "In addition," said Kurzban, "the
policy decisions concerning this case were not made by the INS or even
the Department of State. The issues were directed from the National
Security Council and the White House."'34
The Haitians had the misfortune of fleeing during an economic
recession in the United States and a presidential election campaign
when the economic and social ills of the country were being blamed on
foreigners. That they were fleeing the poorest country in the hemi-
sphere blinded many Americans to the widescale political persecution
occurring in the wake of the Haitian coup. The concern overwhelmingly
was about the social and economic impact of poor immigrants on the
United States. There was little appreciation expressed on the campaign
trail either for the dangers faced by Haitians being hunted down for
their political beliefs, or of the implications of this policy on the rest of
the world.
With the May 23rd Kennebunkport Order,33 Bush followed the
logic of the position he was arguing in the courts, and did away with
screening altogether.3 6 From that point on, Haitians caught by the
Coast Guard would be summarily returned without a hearing to deter-
mine if they had valid refugee claims. The distinction made by Bush on
November 21 between economic migrants and political refugees was
gone, and with the Kennebunkport Order the parameters of the discus-
sion about refugee rights were radically changed. The adequacy and
fairness of asylum procedures, which had been the preoccupation of
American refugee rights advocates throughout the 1980s, were no
longer relevant in the case of persons interdicted in international waters
or otherwise blocked from access to the procedures.
32. FAIR Warns of Potential Haitian "Mariel'; Calls for Repeal of Cuban Adjustment Act,
Press Release, FAIR, Nov. 20, 1991.
33. Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Legislation and National Security of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Apr. 9, 1992 (statement of IraJ.
Kurzban, General Counsel for the Haitian Refugee Center).
34. Id.
35. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23, 133 (1992).
36. Id.
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II. Preserving First Asylum: The Vietnamese Boat People Model
The international system of refugee protection is based on an under-
standing that countries immediately bordering a refugee-producing
State will accept refugees until the rest of the world can assist. The bor-
dering State is called the country of first asylum. Over the years, the
United States and other rich, industrialized countries, removed from ref-
ugee hot spots, have maintained pressure on potential first-asylum
countries not to turn back refugees. This has been demonstrated most
dramatically by the international response to the exodus of Vietnamese
boat people. The greatest surge of boat departures occurred in 1979.
Feeling threatened by the massive exodus, Malaysia began pushing the
boats back to sea, stranding an estimated 40,000 Vietnamese boat peo-
ple.3 7 Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines soon followed suit,
stopping boats from reaching their shores.3 8
In July 1979, the UNHCR convened a conference in Geneva, at
which the United States and other countries agreed to relieve the bur-
den on the first asylum countries. The countries decided to resettle sig-
nificant numbers of refugees and agreed to provide at least temporary
asylum.3 9 "The conference appeared to be a success on virtually all
counts," wrote Court Robinson.4 0 "The policy of resettlement in order
to secure asylum worked for Vietnamese refugees with often remarkable
efficiency. The boat people population in the region dropped from
205,000 in mid-1979 to about 40,000 three years later." 4 1 Most impor-
tantly, the doors were kept open in Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, and the Philippines to those making their initial escape.
Robinson was not uncritical of the reliance on resettlement outside the
region as the means of preserving first asylum. He observed that over
the years the Vietnamese appeared to be leaving "not in search of asy-
lum, but in search of resettlement."'4 2 He suggested diversifying the
protection mechanisms, including orderly migration programs from
within Vietnam, and other regional solutions, including "valid screening
procedures, local settlement, and safe repatriation."'43 This would pre-
serve first asylum without creating a different kind of magnet for boat
departure in the form of an almost automatic resettlement offer.44
The process of admitting to the United States more than 500,000
Vietnamese boat people who landed in Asian countries of first asylum
has been expensive and politically difficult. First asylum was maintained
only through the great efforts of the United States and other countries
37. JOSEPH CERQUONE, UNCERTAIN HARBORS: THE PLIGHT OF VIETNAMESE BOAT
PEOPLE 4-5 (1987).
38. Id.
39. Court Robinson, Sins of Omission: The New Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, THE WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY: 1988 IN REVIEW 5 (1989).
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 10.
44. Id.
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willing to resettle the refugees. A decade after the first Geneva confer-
ence on the Vietnamese boat people, a new Comprehensive Plan of
Action ("CPA") was forged at another meeting of governments in
Geneva inJune 1989. Under the CPA, the countries of the region, such
as Hong Kong and Thailand, agreed that "temporary refuge will be
given to all asylum seekers. ' 45 However, they also established screen-
ing procedures for asylum seekers. The screened-in refugees would be
allowed to seek resettlement; persons screened-out (found not to be ref-
ugees), "should return to their country of origin in accordance with
international practices." '4 6 The agreement added that "[i]n the first
instance, every effort will be made to encourage voluntary return.' 
47
As the CPA was being implemented, controversy arose over the
adequacy of Hong Kong's screening procedures (which began well
before the CPA, in 1988), the conditions of detention in its closed
camps, and the decision by Hong Kong and Britain in 1990 to forcibly
repatriate screened-out Vietnamese. The U.S. government strongly
opposed the forced return of the screened-out refugees. U.S. Deputy
Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger, the head of the U.S. delega-
tion to the conference, declared that "[u]nless and until dramatic
improvements occur in [Vietnam's] economic, social and political life,
the United States will remain unalterably opposed to the forced repatria-
tion of Vietnamese asylum seekers." 4 8 The United States opposition
was addressed to the forced return of asylum seekers who had been
screened out and found not to be refugees. There was no suggestion
that anyone would be forcibly repatriated without first undergoing a ref-
ugee screening procedure.
III. The Search for a Regional Solution in the Caribbean Basin
For a variety of historical reasons, the United States became the princi-
pal champion of the first asylum rights of Vietnamese boat people. But
as the Haitian refugee crisis heated up, and the United States govern-
ment's radically variant response was revealed, a geographical aspect
became evident as well. Vietnam was about as far away from the United
States as the globe allows; the same is not true of Haiti.
In other words, unlike the situation with Vietnamese boat people,
the United States now found itself positioned as a country of first asy-
lum. Although it was not the closest country to Haiti, it was generally
assumed that most Haitians taking off in rickety boats intended the
United States as their preferred destination. This raised a question at
the outset whether a Haitian asylum seeker who sets down briefly in
Cuba or the Bahamas to repair and reprovision his boat and then contin-
45. Court Robinson, Pirate Attacks on Vietnamese Refugees Grow More Vicious, WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY: 1989 IN REVIEW 59 (1990).
46. Id. at 54.
47. Id.
48. Update, REFUGEE REP., June 16, 1989, at 8.
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ues on to the United States can be said, when landing, to have reached
the country of first asylum. While one could quibble with the notion of
"first," United States law, at least, seems clear that stopping briefly in
transit, where no protection is offered or sought, does not invalidate the
asylum claim in the United States.49
In 1971, when refugees were admitted as conditional entrants
under the seventh preference category, the Supreme Court ruled that an
alien fearing persecution must have reached the United States as "a con-
sequence of [his or her] flight in search of refuge," "reasonably proxi-
mate to the flight," and not "interrupted by intervening residence in a
third country reasonably constituting a termination of the original flight
in search of refuge."50 The federal regulations issued in 1990 that
implement the United States asylum procedure provide that a refugee
has not been firmly resettled in a third country provided that "his entry
into that nation was a necessary consequence of his flight from persecu-
tion, that he remained in that nation only as long as was necessary to
arrange onward travel, and that he did not establish significant ties to
that nation." 51
Given the almost automatic credible fear of persecution that the
United States government accords to Cubans fleeing Cuba, there ought
to be sympathy for the notion that a person compelled to leave one dan-
gerous place ought not to be compelled to seek asylum in another where
conditions may also be oppressive. Although it is less relevant to a dis-
cussion about boat departures, the same considerations ought to inform
discussions about the availability and desirability of asylum in the
Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic has a long history of
summary, at times brutal, treatment of Haitians in its territory. For
years, undocumented Haitians were lured to the Dominican Republic by
recruiters working for the Dominican State Sugar Council. Once inside
the Dominican Republic, they would be taken into military custody and
transported to sugar plantations, where they would be forcibly confined
for the duration of the sugar harvest. 52 Although some improvements
in conditions were noted in 1992, the plantations continued to foster
harsh, abusive, and restrictive treatment of Haitian laborers.
Human rights groups, including Americas Watch and Amnesty
International, have documented cases of individuals with strong asylum
claims who were not able to register their claims for refugee status, and
who were forced to work on the plantations after crossing into the
Dominican Republic. 53 This is particularly disturbing since the Domini-
can Republic has a well-established record of periodically repatriating
49. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a).
50. Rosenberg v. Yee Chien Woo, 402 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1971).
51. 8 C.F.R. § 208.15(a).
52. See AMERICAS WATCH AND THE NATIONAL COALITION FOR HAITIAN REFUGEES, A
TROUBLED YEAR: HAITIANS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (1992), as well as previous
reports by the organizations.
53. Id. at 23, regarding the case ofJean Claude Aladin; Haiti: Human Rights Held
to Ransom, 26 AMNESTY INT'L (Aug. 1992), regarding the case of Prosper Th6rism6.
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Haitian workers summarily. Approximately 7,000 Haitians were forcibly
returned in 1991, and another 25,000 to 50,000 were coerced to "volun-
tarily" return to Haiti. 54 The repatriations were summary as well as
capricious, often a result of round-ups in which persons entitled to
Dominican residence were detained and deported.
In March 1992, the U.S. Committee for Refugees ("USCR")
reported that the Dominican Republic pointedly refused to establish
border camps for Haitian refugees and failed to provide a screening sys-
tem to evaluate their claims for asylum. USCR stated that:
No Haitian has been accepted as a political refugee by the Dominican
government; it has treated the few who have made formal applications for
official status with open hostility. Some have been placed under arrest,
and threatened with refoulement .... For Haitian refugees, hostility and
neglect mean that fear, uncertainty, and physical hardship are everyday
companions. 55
Given that the United States could legitimately be considered a
country of first asylum in the region, the straightforward course of
action when the refugee numbers began to grow in November 1991
would have been for the United States to allow Haitian boat people to
land, or to rescue those in distress and bring them ashore, and to give
them the opportunity to apply for asylum like everyone else. This is the
practice accepted as a customary norm and formalized in the UNHCR's
ExCom Conclusion No. 23 (XXXII), which places a positive obligation
on states not only not to return asylum seekers rescued at sea, but to
admit them on a temporary basis:
In accordance with established international practice, supported by the
relevant international instruments, persons rescued at sea should nor-
mally be disembarked at the next port of call. This practice should also
be applied in the case of asylum seekers rescued at sea. In cases of large-
scale influx, asylum seekers rescued at sea should always be admitted, at least on a
temporary basis. States should assist in facilitating their disembarkation by
acting in accordance with the principles of international solidarity and
burden-sharing in granting resettlement opportunities. 56
On November 11, 1991, Sadako Ogata, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, called on the United States to "allow all of
the individuals now on board [United States Coast Guard] vessels to be
54. Id. at 9. The U.S. State Department Bureau for Human Rights and Humanita-
rian Affairs, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (1992) says, at 575-76, that 6,000
Haitians were forcibly repatriated in 1991, citing the Dominican Republic
government.
55. ROBIN KIRK, STONE OF REFUGE: HAITIAN REFUGEES IN THE DOMINICAN REPUB-
LIC 2,3 (1992).
56. Problems Related to the Rescue of Asylum Seekers in Distress at Sea, Conclusion No.
23 (XXXIII). Conclusion endorsed by the Executive Committee of the High Com-
missioner's Programme upon the Recommendation of the Sub-Committee of the
Whole on International Protection of Refugees, 1981, Conclusions on the International
Protection of Refugees Adopted by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme,
(UNHCR-Geneva, 1980) 53 (emphasis added).
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disembarked in the United States and admitted for determination of
their refugee status."'57 The parameters of debate had not yet shifted.
Her concern, consistent with ExCom Conclusions, was the Haitians'
right to be admitted to seek asylum; she apparently assumed that forced
return was not under consideration by the United States authorities.
But the United States clearly had other intentions. Admitting the
Haitians, even temporarily, was not an option the United States would
choose. The government came up with the idea of creating an artificial
tier of first-asylum countries in the region. It began shopping around
the Caribbean to create middlemen to take on the Haitians interdicted
by the United States Coast Guard. The choices-Belize, Venezuela, and
Honduras-were demonstrably less well equipped than the United
States to shoulder the burden of caring for the refugees, and very
unlikely stopping points for anyone journeying by boat from Haiti.
By November 25, 1991, 4,530 Haitians had been interdicted in the
post-coup period.58 Of that number, about 3,600 were on United States
Coast Guard or Navy vessels in international waters of the Caribbean or
at the United States Navy base at Guantinamo Bay, Cuba; 120 had been
screened in to the United States to pursue asylum claims; and 351 were
transferred to Venezuela and Honduras.59 Conditions for the 250 Hai-
tians in Honduras were harsh. Honduras is not a signatory to the
United Nations Refugee Convention and Protocol, and has a deplorable
record with respect to Salvadoran refugees who were kept as virtual pris-
oners in closed camps during the 1980s. There are well-substantiated
reports of abuse of refugees by Honduran military personnel. The Hai-
tians were held in a school building surrounded by barbed wire and
guarded by soldiers. Within a short period of time, nearly all of the
Haitians in Honduras "voluntarily" repatriated. 60
Members of Congress as well as the Administration complained
publicly about the lack of response from other governments in the
region. But there was good reason to doubt that temporary asylum
offers from other countries in the region would be forthcoming. First,
Haitians in the Caribbean, very much like Vietnamese in Southeast Asia,
are not generally welcome. As with the Vietnamese, this is due to a vari-
ety of historical, cultural, economic, and, probably, racial reasons.
Paralleling the Malaysian and Thai pushbacks of Vietnamese boats, the
Bahamas has also pushed Haitian boats out to sea. On July 10, 1990,
the Bahamian Defense Forces interdicted a Haitian boat; the boat cap-
sized as it was being towed, drowning at least thirty-nine Haitians. 6'
57. Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Nov. 11,
1991 (unpublished) (on file with the author).
58. Haitian Interdiction Crisis Erupts, REFUGEE REP., Nov. 29, 1991, at 1.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, THE WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY-1991 86
(1991).
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More importantly, there was a question of responsibility. Although
the United States assumed (probably correctly in the overwhelming
majority of cases) that the Haitian boats were bound for the United
States, it was nevertheless United States naval and coast guard vessels
that went out into international waters to take the Haitians into custody.
The Haitians had not entered the territories or territorial waters of sur-
rounding countries; they had been taken into United States custody by
official United States government forces at the behest of the President.
Since the United States had gone out of its way (i.e., outside its territo-
rial waters) to take the Haitians into custody, it strained logic to see
them as any other country's responsibility.
Both the Bush Administration and now the Clinton Administration
like to put a humanitarian gloss on interdiction by calling it "rescue at
sea." Of course, it isn't. The United States "rescues" boats that are not
in distress and detains their occupants, even against their will. In all
cases, without exception, the boats are sunk, destroying the property of
the boat owners. But for the shaky "legal" foundation of an exchange of
letters between representatives of President Reagan and "Baby Doc"
Duvalier-a thoroughly discredited dictator-the United States interdic-
tion of these boats on the high seas would easily rank as an act of inter-
national piracy. 62
But, for the sake of argument, taking the two United States presi-
dents at their word, the ExCom Conclusion No. 23 instructs them that
"asylum seekers rescued at sea should always be admitted at least on a
temporary basis."' 63 And where should they be admitted? The ExCom
Conclusion says that "persons rescued at sea should normally be dis-
embarked at the next port of call." 64 It is quite a stretch to interpret
Honduras, Venezuela, or Belize as the "next port of call" for United
States Coast Guard vessels patrolling the Windward Passage.
Rather than acting in accord with customary international norms for
the protection of asylum seekers at sea, norms that the United States
government actively promoted in Southeast Asia, the United States gov-
ernment spent its energies looking for dumping grounds among
regional regimes that had shown little regard for refugees in the past
and who were far less capable of absorbing them. The United States
position stood the principle of burden sharing on its head. Unquestion-
ably, the United States economy, even in recession, was better able to
absorb a refugee influx than any other in the region. In addition, the
United States legal system was far more likely to ensure respect for due
process once the asylum claimant gained access to the procedures.
62. See LAWYERS COMMITrTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOULEMENT: THE
FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAMAN INTERDICTION AGREEMENT 13
(1990) ("In an interview with representatives of the Lawyers Committee, President
Prosper Avril stated that he believes that the interdiction agreement is illegal under
Haitian law since an exchange of diplomatic letters is not a proper method of enter-
ing into a bilateral agreement with another country.")
63. Conclusion No. 23 (XXXIII), supra note 56, at 53.
64. Id.
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IV. The Clinton Disappointment
During his campaign for the presidency, Bill Clinton seemed clearly to
understand the essential cruelty and illegality of the Bush policy of sum-
mary return. Clinton stated:
I am appalled by the decision of the Bush Administration to pick up flee-
ing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti before
considering their claim to political asylum .... This process must not
stand. It is a blow to the principle of first asylum and to America's moral
authority in defending the rights of refugees around the world. 65
In this statement, Clinton not only demonstrated a sensitivity to the
fears of fleeing Haitians and the need to protect them, but also showed
an understanding of the implications of the policy for the principle of
first asylum.
This level of understanding makes Clinton's post-election reversal
and reversion to a warmed-over Bush Administration Haitian refugee
policy all the more distressing. The principal outlines of the refugee
aspect of the policies differ only slightly in that Clinton says he will begin
immediately to make it safer and easier to apply for refugee status within
Haiti by, among other things, increasing the numbers of United States
officials posted there for refugee processing. 6 6 His rationale for the pol-
icy is identical to that put forward by Bush on November 21, 1991. "I
fear that boat departures in the near future would result in further tragic
losses of life," he said in a radio address broadcast to Haiti on January
14, 1993.67 "For this reason, the practice of returning those who flee
Haiti will continue, for the time being, after I become President."6 8
It sounds humanitarian. If the United States can provide safe, via-
ble ways for Haitians under threat of persecution to escape other than
by taking off in leaky boats, then by all means, the United States should
pursue every available option. President Clinton and his transition team
deserve due credit for pursuing political solutions within Haiti that
could restore respect for human rights and democracy, and that would
make escape unnecessary. But what do we do in the meantime? What
do we do when a desperate refugee fearing for his life jumps in a boat
and throws himself on our mercy pleading for asylum? President Bush
made the decision to send him back. It was automatic. It was effective.
It stopped the flow. What refugee, after all, would take the risk of the
boat journey if being caught meant certain return into the hands of his
persecutors?
In the name of order, the Bush Administration sacrificed the most
fundamental principle of refugee protection-the right of refugees to
65. Clinton Continues Summary Return of Haitians: U.S. Lawyers Investigate In-County
Processing, REFUGEE REP., Jan. 29, 1993, at 1, 2 (quoting Presidential Candidate Bill
Clinton).
66. Id. at 1.
67. Id. (quoting President-Elect Bill Clinton in radio address to Haitian people on
Jan. 14, 1993)
68. Id.
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flee their countries, to seek asylum from persecution in other countries,
and not to be returned into the hands of their persecutors.
V. In-Country Refugee Processing: An Insufficient Alternative to
Asylum
In response to criticism of his interdiction policy, President Bush, in
February 1992, introduced a program of in-country refugee processing
from within Haiti. The expectation was that Haitians would come to the
United States embassy in Port-au-Prince to apply for refugee status. At
a later date they would return for interviews, first with State Department
consular officers, then with Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") officers. Applicants would then have to wait for visas to be
processed. By the close of 1992, 15,580 persons had inquired about the
program, but only 136 had actually been admitted to the United States,
an average of 12 per month.6 9 What protection was really being offered
for people claiming to fear for their lives? They were basically told to
"take a number and wait your turn." They were left to their own devices
to figure out how to avoid arrest during the wait.
The message President Bush sent to refugees was: You can only be
protected if you are willing to wait in line. But real refugees can't wait.
That is the essence of what it is to be a refugee, to be genuinely afraid
and to need to escape. And President Bush sent them another message:
If you attempt to take control of your own destiny by escaping on your
own to seek asylum outside Haiti, you will be punished-you will be sent
back to the very situation that threatens your life.
In-country refugee processing may help for some people under cer-
tain circumstances, but it is not a substitute for the right to seek asylum
outside the country of persecution. Overseas refugee admissions proce-
dures are completely discretionary. The United States government can
designate as a refugee for United States admission anyone it chooses,
but it is compelled to accept no one. A discretionary refugee admissions
program, therefore, does not come close to addressing the requirements
of refugee protection in international law. Expanding the in-country
refugee processing program is a positive step, but it cannot be a smoke-
screen for refoulement.
A similar in-country procedure for processing refugees was created
at the height of the Vietnamese boat exodus. However, those who
decided to flee by boat were never turned back simply because such a
program existed. As discussed previously, the United States was vigilant
in ensuring that regional governments would respect the principle of
first asylum. For the United States to have said that the existence of an
Orderly Departure Program meant that Vietnamese boat people could
be summarily returned without a hearing was unthinkable.
In-country processing has also been used for resettling Soviet Jews
69. Id. at 4.
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and Evangelical Christians out of Moscow. 70 In fact, due to the direct
admissions from Cuba, Vietnam, and the former Soviet Union, the
majority of "refugee" admissions to the United States this year are not
even refugees by international definition, because they are not outside
their home countries when they are so designated. 7 1 Long before in-
country refugee processing had started for Haitians, Ricardo Inzunza,
the deputy commissioner of the INS, identified the problems associated
with in-country processing:
Unfortunately, in most cases, those most in need of this legal remedy
[i.e., in-country processing]-those most vulnerable to abuses and with
least access to any viable alternatives-are least likely to be able to take
advantage of it. Those in active flight are unlikely to get into the U.S.
embassy, or even to it, without being noticed and/or arrested .... It is
slow and many persons with a "well-founded fear of persecution" simply
cannot wait for such processing to be completed.7 2
In June 1992, then-Representative Stephen Solarz (who later
became one of the architects of the Clinton policy during the transition
period) sharpened this general criticism of in-country processing in the
specific Haitian context, where the Bush Administration used it as a
justification for its summary return policy. Solarz testified before the
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee that the use of in-country process-
ing to justify the summary return of boat people was "a ludicrous
argument."'73
In the Soviet Union, Cuba, Vietnam, and Romania, in-country processing
has been an alternative option for those with the inclination, courage, and
gumption to use it. But it has never been the exclusive option, and it is
clear that making it the exclusive option does not conform to interna-
tional law.74
Solarz, then-chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific
Affairs, and a prime mover within Congress in defense of Vietnamese
refugees, commented on the damage the Haitian policy would do for
refugee protection in Asia.
I pity the poor American diplomat who in the future is asked to go to the
British or the Bangladeshis or the Malaysians or the Thais and say,
"Respect the principle of first asylum." There will be peals of laughter in
the room. They will say, "Who are you kidding. You guys don't respect
the principle yourself. Why should we." We are forfeiting our moral
authority here. And we are compromising our capacity to come to the
defense of refugees all over the world. 75
70. Ricardo Inzunza, The Refugee Act of 1980: Ten Years After-Still the JI'ay to Go, 2
INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 413, 421-22 (1990).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Congress, Courts React to Presidential Order Turning Back Haitian Boat People, REFU-
GEE REP., June 19, 1992, at 11, 14.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 13.
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Solarz need not have limited his comments to East Asia. In October
1992, Spain reached an agreement with Morocco by which Morocco
agreed to step up its patrols in the Strait of Gibraltar to prevent Moroc-
cans from leaving for Spain.76 Also, in 1992, Yemen and Kenya both
briefly refused to allow boats carrying Somali refugees to land on their
shores. 77
Since mid-1991, Italy has been patrolling the Adriatic Sea and
interdicting Albanian boats. 78 In August 1991, Italy summarily returned
19,000 Albanians who had arrived by boat, including about 2,000 who
refused to leave a stadium where they were being held until Italian
authorities were promised that their asylum claims would be consid-
ered.79 However, they too were rounded up and summarily deported
with hardly a murmur of international protest.
In 1992, Italy continued to declare Albania a safe country and con-
sidered all Albanian asylum seekers economic migrants despite deterio-
rating human rights conditions in that country. OnJuly 9, 1992, a group
of 103 Albanians, including at least 30 military personnel, comman-
deered an Albanian military vessel and fled to Italy. After landing at the
Brindisi port, Italian authorities apprehended the Albanians and sum-
marily returned them to Albania by plane without a hearing of their asy-
lum claims.80
These developments on the international front might have occurred
with or without the United States precedent. At the least, however,
Solarz's point about the "poor American diplomat" is well taken. The
United States is now in no moral position to protest the treatment of
refugees and asylum seekers by other governments, even when the
United States thinks it is wrong. For example, on December 10, 1991,
after Hong Kong forcibly repatriated twenty-eight Vietnamese, the
United States State Department expressed "regret" that the returnees
had not been allowed to apply for a voluntary return program run by the
United Nations.81 No sooner had the State Department spokesman
made this statement than he was confronted with the question of why,
the United States opposes forced refugee returns to Vietnam but not to
Haiti. He awkwardly responded that "the United States believes that
country conditions in Haiti are such that the persons who are returned
will not face persecution," but that in Vietnam "the United States
opposes forcible repatriation under present conditions in that coun-
try."82 This statement holds Haitians to a standard of actually facing
76. Alan Riding, Aliens Find a European Gateway at Spain's Coast, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct.
18, 1992, at 3.
77. 300 Somali Refugees Leave Ship Off Kenya, N.Y. TMES, July 29, 1992, at A2.
78. See Bill Frelick, Closing Ranks to Deny Access to Asylum, IMMIGRATION NEWSLET-
TER, National Lawyers Guild., Vol. 20, No. 3, 1991, at 3-5 (Aug. 1992).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Barbara Basler, Hong Kong Ousts More Boat People, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1991,
at A16.
82. Id.
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"persecution" and presumes no Haitians meet this standard. In the
same breath, it uses a vague standard of "present conditions" in Viet-
nam as sufficient to prevent return of Vietnamese. There is no sugges-
tion that Vietnamese would have to show actual, probable, or even
possible persecution upon return to Vietnam in order to be protected
from involuntary return. The State Department spokesman's formula-
tion did not actually say that human rights conditions were any worse in
Vietnam than in Haiti. Indeed, by the Bureau for Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs's own reporting on the two countries, it would be
quite difficult to promote such an argument.8 3
United States government actions on Haitians render its words
about refugee protection meaningless. Such actions signal to the rest of
the world our seriousness in upholding international principles of refu-
gee protection. If the Clinton Administration bows to domestic pres-
sures by saying the United States cannot afford to absorb a refugee
influx, then it will never again be in a position to insist that other, poorer
and smaller countries do the same. How could the United States tell
Malawi to host nearly a million Mozambican refugees, tell Pakistan to
host three million Afghanis, or tell Croatia to keep its borders open to
Bosnians? Candidate Clinton was right: the policy is "a blow to the
principle of first asylum and to America's moral authority in defending
the rights of refugees around the world."8 4
VI. Recommendations
As a first step, President Clinton should return to his campaign
promise to lift President Bush's executive order for the summary return
of Haitian boat people. In addition, he should rescind the Reagan exec-
utive order and discontinue the interdiction program itself. Only then
would President Clinton be able effectively to involve other countries in
the region in providing first asylum to Haitian asylum seekers.
As long as the United States government goes into international
waters, interdicts boats, and takes the passengers into custody, it cannot
expect other countries to think of the Haitian refugee population as a
shared responsibility. However, if rescue-at-sea operations were genu-
ine, and if the Haitian boat people boarded Coast Guard cutters will-
ingly, the United States would have a better claim to appeal to "next
ports of call" in the area, and to ask other nations outside the region,
such as France and Canada, to share the burden.
If planned properly and in conjunction with other countries, the
offer of safe haven need not precipitate a stampede of boat people to the
United States. While a limited number of persons under immediate
threat could be brought to the United States directly from within Haiti,
this should not be used as a rationale for denying asylum to others who
83. See generally U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAU FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANI-
TARIAN AFFAIRS, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (1992).
84. REFUGEE REP., supra note 66, at 2.
Vol. 26
1993 Haitian Boat Interdiction and Return
opt to escape on their own. More importantly, the United States should,
working through the UNHCR, assist countries such as the Bahamas,
Suriname, and French Guiana to accommodate refugees temporarily
until their safe return to Haiti could be assured. One way to persuade
these countries to keep their doors open is to resettle some Haitian refu-
gees in the United States.
Boat people in seaworthy vessels who refuse offers of assistance
should be allowed to sail on, although their movement could be closely
monitored. When they reach United States territorial waters, the Coast
Guard could then board the vessels and INS officials could determine if
any on board have proper travel documents. Assuming most would not,
they would be placed in exclusion proceedings where they could file asy-
lum claims and have the right, at their own expense, to legal counsel.
Extra immigration judges could be placed in Miami in anticipation of a
large influx. While undoubtedly these arrangements would represent
increased costs to the United States, the fears of the adjudication system
being completely overwhelmed are exaggerated.
Most Haitians, even with strong claims, would have difficulty navi-
gating the asylum process in the United States. Although high levels of
repression continue in Haiti, the extra-legal and capricious character of
much of the persecution there, combined with a largely illiterate society
lacking a functioning justice system, means that documenting and cor-
roborating claims is exceedingly difficult. Given these circumstances, a
temporary safe haven seems particularly warranted for those who are
not able to establish an asylum claim, but nevertheless express fear of
return. Immigrationjudges ought to be instructed to allow Haitians fac-
ing deportation to designate Guantinamo as the place to which they
should be deported.
Despite claims of the United States military to the contrary, the
United States has the capacity to build a decent refugee camp, or camps,
at Guantinamo to provide temporary safe haven to persons unwilling to
go back but who have not established an asylum claim. Such a holding
camp could also be used for persons rescued at sea pending screening of
their claims and third-country resettlement.
In contrast to the way in which Guantinamo has been operated thus
far, however, a safe haven camp must be predicated on voluntariness.
The Haitians' camp would be for those who have chosen Guantinamo
either by willingly allowing themselves to be rescued at sea and staying
at Guantinamo awaiting screening, or those who chose Guantinamo
over being deported to Haiti. United States voluntary agencies and the
UNHCR would have to be invited to assist in administering the camp(s),
and the military would have to keep a low profile, staying outside the
actual boundaries of the camp compound(s) unless security made their
presence necessary. The United States authorities at Guantinamo, in
close consultation and cooperation with the UNHCR, would encourage
and facilitate voluntary repatriation for those who felt sufficiently safe to
return. This would have to be completely, non-coercive, although posi-
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tive incentives could be made available to make voluntary repatriation
an attractive option.
Although the poor conditions in Honduras and elsewhere certainly
contributed to the decision of nearly all of the few hundred Haitians
who were provided regional safe haven to repatriate, the fact that the
United States was no longer open to them undoubtedly also contributed
to their decision to return. The same likely would be the case for those
Haitians who would opt for Haiti after being deported from the United
States. They would be offered temporary asylum with no opportunity
for onward movement. The temporary asylum option, therefore, would
be self-selecting. Those who left Haiti primarily for the purpose of
immigrating to the United States, ultimately frustrated in that attempt,
would most likely decide to go home. Those who continued to harbor
genuine fears would stay and be provided for, but would know that there
was no "future" for them at Guantinamo. Their situation would be
essentially the same as a majority of the other 18 million refugees
around the world, most of whom live in first asylum camps, with no
prospect of third-country resettlement.
The responsibility of the United States would be to assist them so
that they could live in safety in temporary asylum pending a durable
solution. Although a relative few would be determined individually to
be refugees and be able to be resettled, most would have to bide their
time until their security in Haiti could be assured.
President Clinton is right to emphasize the need to address root
causes of refugee flows, which, in Haiti, means essentially the restora-
tion of democracy and respect for human rights. Once that is done, the
refugee problem solves itself-persons in exile can repatriate voluntarily
and persons within the country no longer feel compelled to flee. This
alone, however, cannot be the sum total of a refugee policy. A refugee
policy is about what to do in the meantime, how to protect and assist
people outside their country while the country of origin is still danger-
ous. Essentially, that is a question of asylum, temporary or permanent.
It is a question that cannot responsibly be avoided.
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